There were a few questions after my presentation on the details concerting serial and parallel processing in computation. Here is a pretty good link to a op-ed article by the chief scientist at NVIDIA: Life After Moore's Law By Bill Dally
Affective Relations with Computation: the problem of HCI:
There is currently a problem of transparency in the affective process of creation involving computed media. The process of computed media is generally obscured by perfect emulation of other forms of media. Lev Manovich’s critique of HCI (Human Computer Interaction) is merely a limited form of this issue.[i] The issue of HCI is not as Manovich states that it is bound to a cinematic mode but that HCI is a layer of mediation that obscures the procedural essence of computation. This layer of mediation draws on many different forms of media and epistemological organizations work to mask the procedural relation between artists and computation. In order for computed media and concepts to express and implicate truly new affects and concepts it will be necessary for those engaged to have a intimate and honest relation to the processes in which they explore.
An artist or thinker who wants to approach computed media on its own plane of immanence is to engage with the procedures that computation makes possible. This is not to say that the ability for an HCI to adequately emulate processes of previous media is bad. It is the mutability of computation that is its tremendously useful power. Yet for computed media to implicate something new, practitioners must engage with it on a much more intimate level.
This of course occurs in most experimental media in which the line between artist and engineer is largely extinct. There is however often a barrier to communicability of the experience of these practitioners and those who would be affected by their creations. It is fortunate that to experience a sculpture, painting, or even film can connect a viewer to the process by which the artist and medium are engaged. One can see and feel the artists brush strokes, chisel marks and imagine the directors splice at each cut. Computed media does not provide us with this kind of connection as long as it is used to emulate other media. For example, if digital-cinema is to critically approach computation it should impart to a high level of procedural transparency in which the viewer can be actively aware of the computed sequence that produces the images before their eyes.
[i] Manovich, Lev, "The Language of New Media," MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 2001. pp. 88-93.
Here is a link to the full essay for those interested.
Showing posts with label Ariel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ariel. Show all posts
Friday, May 21, 2010
Thursday, May 13, 2010
From Algorithm to Process: Striation and Smoothness in Computation
Last night I talked about the main thrust of the essay I'm working on for the end of our class. It will primarily be a starting point in developing two terms: the algorithm-image and the process-image. I opened my talk last night with a quote from Cinema 2 in which Deleuze talks about how the expression of movement-images and time-images will not be developed any further with electronic media than by pre-existing cinematic forms. Instead electronic media will have to forge new affects and concepts in its own right.
"The new automatism is worthless in itself if it is not put to the service of a powerful, obscure, condensed will to art, aspiring to deploy itself through involuntary movements which none the less do not restrict it. An original will to art has already been defined by us in the change affecting the intelligible content of cinema itself: the substitution of the time-image for the movement-image. So that electronic images will have to be based on still another will to art, or on as yet unknown aspects of the time-image."
"What is important is that the cinematographic image was already achieving effects which were not like those of electronics, but which had autonomous anticipatory functions in the time-image as will to art. Thus Bresson's cinema has no need of computing or cybernetic machines; yet the 'model' is a modern psychological automaton, because it is defined in relation to the speech-act, and no longer, as before, by motor action (Bresson was constantly thinking about automatism)."
(Cinema 2, 266)
It is in this spirit that I wish to make an attempt at describing the qualities that are significant to artists and thinkers in their current and future engagement with computation in general and computed media in particular. Instead of focusing on the issues of subjective bodily experience as Hansen has argued, I would like to take the position that Delueze has proven to be most interested in, the artist-artwork relation. The terms algorithm-image and process-image will be developed from the examination of the affective and conceptual relations that artists and thinkers enter into in their engagement with computation. The rough distinctions between these two term are as follows:
Algorithm-Image: finite, closed and striated process.
A prime example which we talked about in class would be most of video game narrative. There are choices to be made yet these choices are limited and the final outcomes are predetermined and of a fairly small set.
Process-Image: open, able to implicate a continuous becoming.
There are not many examples of this. Yet, the fractal video I showed in class and Benjamin's example of data-moshing are images that implicate a specific process at work in computation. With and through these images a certain open-ended implication of a infinitely itterable procedure is affectively grasped. In fractal we are presented with a sequence of a single geometry repeated such that a infinite space can be easily imagined with each part necessarily engaged with and situated in a unique relation with the whole. In data-moshing we are shown a glimpse of the process by which movement images are in process. Striped of their unique frames, movement becomes a series of vectors. Movement as process and in process.
I will also examine what I find to be the true issues embedded in HCI. I believe that Lev Manovich's critique of HCI is merely a limited form of the essential issue. The issue of HCI is not that it is bound to a cinematic mode but that HCI is a layer of mediation that obscures the procedural essence of computation (Hansen, 34). The layer of metaphor that draws on many different forms of media and epistemological organizations work to mask the procedural relation between artists and computation. In order for computed media and concepts to express and implicate truly new affects and concepts it will be necessary for those engaged to have a intimate and honest relation to the processes in which they explore.
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
The Digital and Immanence Co-Implicated, or A Minor-Digital
In reading Hansen I've been returned back to the concept of the smooth and the striated being co-implicated. One of the most interesting aspects of this was illustrated by Deluze and Guattari in ATP when they said that all progress must take place within striated space while all becoming occurs in smooth space (ATP, 486). I talked about this a little in my presentation (part B). Immanence is implicated by striated technology that operates at such a scale and velocity that immanence is able to be implicated. The way in which striation is connected to technology is given an example in Mandelbrot's fractals (ATP, 486-488). These fractal images would not have been possible with out the increasingly iterable computational tools available to Mandelbrot. The systematic approach of fractal geometry is a good example according to D&G because it "provides a general determination for smooth space that takes into account its differences from and the relations to striated space" (ATP, 488).
The example is but one of many instances in which a striated system can function in a way that implicates an immanent concept. For me, I think that this is also the case in cinema. The technology of the movement-image is such that it accelerates the static technology of photography to such a velocity that not only is movement implicated, but time as well. Deleuze would argue that the implicated becoming in cinema is not movement but time. Hansen's search for what is "new" in new media holds a similar affinity to Deleuze's search for what is co-implicated in cinema (Hansen, 21). Although he takes his conclusions in a rather non-Deleuzian direction I believe his starting point is very important. What does the striation that produces the digital (image/media) co-implicate? What kind of immanent concepts can the digital imply? Hansen seems to focus on the way in which the digital striates the status of representation in media and therefore shifts the origin of meaning and interpretation to the body.
If we put Hansen's conclusions aside how would we provide a "general determination [of] smooth space that takes into account the differences from and the relations to striated space"? (ATP, 488) A single equation can be repeated enough to imply a conception of natural forms in the case of fractals (ie. the geometry of leaves and mountains). A single frozen slice of action/time can be taken again and again a such a rate such that it implies movement and time in the cinematic image. What does the digital striate? How are these qualities expressed in the 'major" media of digital? How are they different and related to the immanent qualities that it quantifies? If there are indeed immanent potentialities within digital technology would a "minor" digital be possible? What would minor digital be like?
For this reason I'm not sure that the reason that data-moshing as Benjamin posted for us implicates movement or time but something quite different (see Movement and the Digital Image). Just as the cinematic image implicates movement and time because of its unique relation to time so then would minor digital implicate immanence due to it's unique relation to smooth space. Data-moshing perhaps asks questions about the digital itself. It foregrounds what Lev Manovich describes as the digital image as only being the surface of pure data (Hansen, 32).
As you may of noticed, I'm not really sure what the digital truly striates. My initial instinct is that the digital striates process and procedure. This is what Manovich calls the processural image (Hansen, 9). Maybe what the digital striates is then a certain cognitive logic and the thing that a minor digital can implicate is a continuum of thought.
-Ariel
The example is but one of many instances in which a striated system can function in a way that implicates an immanent concept. For me, I think that this is also the case in cinema. The technology of the movement-image is such that it accelerates the static technology of photography to such a velocity that not only is movement implicated, but time as well. Deleuze would argue that the implicated becoming in cinema is not movement but time. Hansen's search for what is "new" in new media holds a similar affinity to Deleuze's search for what is co-implicated in cinema (Hansen, 21). Although he takes his conclusions in a rather non-Deleuzian direction I believe his starting point is very important. What does the striation that produces the digital (image/media) co-implicate? What kind of immanent concepts can the digital imply? Hansen seems to focus on the way in which the digital striates the status of representation in media and therefore shifts the origin of meaning and interpretation to the body.
If we put Hansen's conclusions aside how would we provide a "general determination [of] smooth space that takes into account the differences from and the relations to striated space"? (ATP, 488) A single equation can be repeated enough to imply a conception of natural forms in the case of fractals (ie. the geometry of leaves and mountains). A single frozen slice of action/time can be taken again and again a such a rate such that it implies movement and time in the cinematic image. What does the digital striate? How are these qualities expressed in the 'major" media of digital? How are they different and related to the immanent qualities that it quantifies? If there are indeed immanent potentialities within digital technology would a "minor" digital be possible? What would minor digital be like?
For this reason I'm not sure that the reason that data-moshing as Benjamin posted for us implicates movement or time but something quite different (see Movement and the Digital Image). Just as the cinematic image implicates movement and time because of its unique relation to time so then would minor digital implicate immanence due to it's unique relation to smooth space. Data-moshing perhaps asks questions about the digital itself. It foregrounds what Lev Manovich describes as the digital image as only being the surface of pure data (Hansen, 32).
As you may of noticed, I'm not really sure what the digital truly striates. My initial instinct is that the digital striates process and procedure. This is what Manovich calls the processural image (Hansen, 9). Maybe what the digital striates is then a certain cognitive logic and the thing that a minor digital can implicate is a continuum of thought.
-Ariel
Thursday, April 8, 2010
Computation and Immanence Part 1: Rhizomatic Computation
I realized after my presentation yesterday that I could have done a much better job making some of my questions more clear. In fact I regret not having paused before opening up the discussion into the realm of cinema. The thoughts I am developing in that area are murky to say the least. I'll try and explain where I'm coming from a bit more in part 3 of this subject. That being said, I'd like to recap the initial part of my presentation and begin to allude to why the questions raised are of interest to me.
Here is the link to the presentation site I was using.
I think the statement that best sums up the issues for parts A through C is this:
The rhizomatic potential of computational space is suspect.
This suspicion is expressed by Deleuze and Guattari in the introductory chapter in ATP (a thousand plateaus). From my point of view, contemporary computation and the tools derived from it are structured such that a relational arrangement that is purely rhizomatic (as well as completely immanent) is not achievable. There are two areas in this claim that should be clarified; computational space and rhizomatic relation.
1)Computational Spaces are media and mediated environments which are predicated on modern computational tools such as the ubiquitous cpu and the directory(folder) based operating system. This necessarily includes spaces as large as the global internet to small local spaces of the desktop computer running locally executed software. The common features that I am interested in are the way in which relations are organized and the methods by which relations and information are transformed. Information and connectivity are organized into hierarchical folders or grid like databases. These pieces are transformed through Boolean logic statements sequenced together to form more complex procedures. It should be clear that computational space is a delimited space in which only certain kinds of information, relation and becoming are allowed.
2) Rhizomatic Relation in its most pure sense should not be achievable within a computational space. For such relation to occur information, relation and becoming must not privilege any hierarchical structure. In rhizomatic computation there would be no folder analogy, no grid of data, no predefined logic of transformation, and no predefined order of operations let alone a general dismissal of true simultaneity. This, in general, is not the nature of the computational space we utilize today.
Finally we come to the danger of "false multiplicities" as mentioned in ATP a couple paragraphs following D&G's initial suspicion of the information sciences. The internet as we experience it today sometimes seems like it holds the potential for a rhizomatic space. The scale at which web sites and individuals are connected is staggering. The velocity at which these connections are made, broken and remade is amazing. It is at the limit of individual perception that the potential for false multiplicities present themselves. I would not go so far as to say that the rhizomatic potential of computational space is not such that immanence cannot be inferred by our experience. However, it is difficult at the scale and velocity of our current global network to see a qualitative difference between space that is purely rhizomatic or merely a hierarchy so vast that it is indistinguishable from the rhizome.
-Ariel
Here is the link to the presentation site I was using.
I think the statement that best sums up the issues for parts A through C is this:
The rhizomatic potential of computational space is suspect.
This suspicion is expressed by Deleuze and Guattari in the introductory chapter in ATP (a thousand plateaus). From my point of view, contemporary computation and the tools derived from it are structured such that a relational arrangement that is purely rhizomatic (as well as completely immanent) is not achievable. There are two areas in this claim that should be clarified; computational space and rhizomatic relation.
1)Computational Spaces are media and mediated environments which are predicated on modern computational tools such as the ubiquitous cpu and the directory(folder) based operating system. This necessarily includes spaces as large as the global internet to small local spaces of the desktop computer running locally executed software. The common features that I am interested in are the way in which relations are organized and the methods by which relations and information are transformed. Information and connectivity are organized into hierarchical folders or grid like databases. These pieces are transformed through Boolean logic statements sequenced together to form more complex procedures. It should be clear that computational space is a delimited space in which only certain kinds of information, relation and becoming are allowed.
2) Rhizomatic Relation in its most pure sense should not be achievable within a computational space. For such relation to occur information, relation and becoming must not privilege any hierarchical structure. In rhizomatic computation there would be no folder analogy, no grid of data, no predefined logic of transformation, and no predefined order of operations let alone a general dismissal of true simultaneity. This, in general, is not the nature of the computational space we utilize today.
Finally we come to the danger of "false multiplicities" as mentioned in ATP a couple paragraphs following D&G's initial suspicion of the information sciences. The internet as we experience it today sometimes seems like it holds the potential for a rhizomatic space. The scale at which web sites and individuals are connected is staggering. The velocity at which these connections are made, broken and remade is amazing. It is at the limit of individual perception that the potential for false multiplicities present themselves. I would not go so far as to say that the rhizomatic potential of computational space is not such that immanence cannot be inferred by our experience. However, it is difficult at the scale and velocity of our current global network to see a qualitative difference between space that is purely rhizomatic or merely a hierarchy so vast that it is indistinguishable from the rhizome.
-Ariel
Wednesday, March 24, 2010
In Defense of Science (Fiction): Mathematical Concepts in Philosophy
The use of modern scientific concepts in popular culture is often incongruent with the specific context in which they were developed. However, the adaptation of science and mathematical concepts in philosophy can, as we have seen in Deleuze's writings, be very helpful in both expanding the conceptual foundations of science/math as well as work towards moving the reader towards a different understanding of the phenomena that those concepts attempt to describe.
If the modern notions of space-time in popular culture suffer from a fundamental misunderstanding of the proper relationship between Newtonian models and relativistic models, it seems that it is important for philosophy texts to be able to honestly tackle the issue of destabilizing models of a fixed universe from its reader's understanding. This is where the value of Deleuze's writings seem to have a potentially positive impact on the public understanding of modern science. These philosophical discussions should never replace scientific discourse, but they do seem to have their place in enabling a certain mental internalization of difficult and complex models that are perhaps never to be individually experienced by our limited senses.
Deleuze seems to allow us to internalize some of these complex ideas especially well in the area of geometry in his continued attempts to displace a Cartesian frame of existence with a fluid and interrelated plane upon which we would live as nomads. Throughout his writings he speaks of rate, change, vectors, manifolds, and heterogeneous planes. Could this not be a deeply abstract way of clearing our minds in such a way as to be more receptive to the seemingly esoteric developments of modern science?
Bernard Cache takes on the project of explicating the conceptual distinction between a geographic and architectural space in dynamic versus static terms. For Cache, geography and geometry are not merely static coordinates, but "frames of probability" in which possibility can exist (Cache 23-30).
In this sense art and architecture can allow for the experience of abstract concepts that are present in modern science and math. It seems that Delueze would ideally want his three realms of science, art, and philosophy to work to reinforce, challenge, and produce together as opposed to sand boxing themselves apart. What is so crazy about using a microscope to crack a nut? Maybe that nut was always a little to hard to crack without it.
-Ariel
If the modern notions of space-time in popular culture suffer from a fundamental misunderstanding of the proper relationship between Newtonian models and relativistic models, it seems that it is important for philosophy texts to be able to honestly tackle the issue of destabilizing models of a fixed universe from its reader's understanding. This is where the value of Deleuze's writings seem to have a potentially positive impact on the public understanding of modern science. These philosophical discussions should never replace scientific discourse, but they do seem to have their place in enabling a certain mental internalization of difficult and complex models that are perhaps never to be individually experienced by our limited senses.
Deleuze seems to allow us to internalize some of these complex ideas especially well in the area of geometry in his continued attempts to displace a Cartesian frame of existence with a fluid and interrelated plane upon which we would live as nomads. Throughout his writings he speaks of rate, change, vectors, manifolds, and heterogeneous planes. Could this not be a deeply abstract way of clearing our minds in such a way as to be more receptive to the seemingly esoteric developments of modern science?
Bernard Cache takes on the project of explicating the conceptual distinction between a geographic and architectural space in dynamic versus static terms. For Cache, geography and geometry are not merely static coordinates, but "frames of probability" in which possibility can exist (Cache 23-30).
In this sense art and architecture can allow for the experience of abstract concepts that are present in modern science and math. It seems that Delueze would ideally want his three realms of science, art, and philosophy to work to reinforce, challenge, and produce together as opposed to sand boxing themselves apart. What is so crazy about using a microscope to crack a nut? Maybe that nut was always a little to hard to crack without it.
-Ariel
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